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This paper provides background information on the likely challenges the rise of China 
and India will pose for the economy of the EU. The purpose is mainly descriptive, namely 
to spell out what kind of trading partner China and India will represent for the EU in the 
foreseeable future. A first observation is that India is several times smaller than China in 
economic terms. Moreover, because its investment rates in both human and physical 
capital are much lower than in China, its growth potential is likely to remain more 
limited.  
China already now exports more manufacturing goods than all other emerging markets 
together. But its export structure is also evolving rapidly and has become rather similar 
to that of advanced economies like the EU. This ‘convergence’ is likely the result of a 
very rapid accumulation of human and especially physical capital. If current trends 
continue, China will have a capital/labour ratio similar to that of the EU by the end of the 
next decade. In terms of human capital, China has already caught up considerably, but 
further progress will be slowed down by its stable demographics and the still low 
enrolment ratio in tertiary education. In both areas, India lags China by several decades.  
The rapid accumulation of capital suggests that the emergence of China will put 
adjustment pressures mainly on capital-intensive industries, not the traditional sectors, 
such as textiles. Another source of friction that is likely to emerge derives from the 
abundance of coal in China, resulting in a relatively carbon- and energy-intensive 
economy. 
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CHINA AND INDIA: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU ECONOMY 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 280/JANUARY 2008 
DANIEL GROS
* 
1. Introduction 
China and India are often mentioned in one breath as representing similar challenges for the EU 
(and indeed all OECD countries). However, the scale of the challenge from each of these two 
economies is not comparable. In terms of the sheer size of the trade and investment flows the 
differences dwarf the similarities, as shown in Table 1 below. At current prices and exchange 
rates, the GDP of China is about twice that of India, and China exports 9 times as much goods 
and still almost twice as much services. In terms of inward FDI, China is more than ten times 
bigger than India. 
Table 1. China and India: Comparing size ($ billion) 
GDP Trade  (exports)  Inward 
  Current PPP  Goods  Services  FDI 
China 2,600  5,000  970  92  78 
India 850  2,500  120  56  7 
EU 27  13,000  13,700  1330  192   
Sources: WEO database, Eurostat and International Comparison Programme (ICP) (2007) of the World Bank. 
The raw data on the size of China and India in economic terms suggest that China on its own is 
large enough to have a strong impact on the global economy (and on the EU), whereas India 
might constitute an important actor in some niche sectors (services trade, especially software). 
Being an order of magnitude smaller than China in economic terms (especially overall trade), 
however, it is not large enough to have, on its own, a noticeable impact on the global or the EU 
economy. This paper will thus concentrate mainly on China. 
We first provide some rough numbers on today’s trade structure as well as the upgrading of the 
human and physical capital stock in China. These numbers suggest that the current differences 
in capital/labour ratios will disappear rapidly and that trade between the EU and China will thus 
become intra-industry in nature. Given that capital will most probably continue to be 
underpriced in China, it is even likely that future trade disputes will arise more frequently in 
those sectors characterised by both high capital intensity and economies of scale (steel, cars, 
ships, etc.), rather than in the ‘old’ labour-intensive sectors (textiles). Japan and Korea 
experienced similar shifts in their export structure earlier last century. 
It is by now widely accepted that an expansion of trade among similar economies causes few 
problems because it is likely to be intra-industry in nature and thus does not displace entire 
industries or large groups of workers (e.g. the low-skilled). One of the key questions about the 
rapid rise of China as a trading economy is thus what kind of trade will expand between China 
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and the EU: inter-industry (China exports textiles against machinery) or intra-industry (two-way 
exchange of highly differentiated varieties of machinery and other manufactured products)? 
The available data suggest that China has already moved a long way towards the second 
paradigm, as can be seen from the evolution of the structure of Chinese exports reported in 
Table 2 below. The share of machinery (plus transport equipment) has more than doubled over 
the last decade, going from 21 to over 47% and is now already higher than that of the EU 
(44.4%).  
Table 2. A comparison of the structure of Chinese and Indian trade (exports) (%) 
   China  EU 
SITC Category  1995  2006  2005 
Food + beverages (0+1+4)  7.9  2.8  5.1 
Minerals + fuels (2+3)  6.5  2.6  5.8 
Chemicals (5)  6.1  4.5  14.7 
Manufactures by material (6)  22.1  18.2  14.1 
Machinery, transport (7) 21.0  47.2  44.4 
Miscellaneous (8)  36.1  24.5  11.1 
Source: UN trade statistics. 
The composition of China’s exports has thus changed rapidly over 10 years and is already now 
rather close to that of the EU. Since the structure of China’s imports is also somewhat different 
however from that of the EU (more imports of machinery, for example), it remains true so far 
that China retains a comparative advantage in ‘traditional’ sectors, such as Textiles (contained 
in SITC (6)) and Miscellaneous (SITC (8) including toys, etc.), whereas the strongest sector for 
the EU is still machinery and transport equipment. A key question for the future is thus whether 
China will be able to continue the rapid shift away from traditional sectors. See also the annex, 
which compares China’s and India’s export structures. 
This note does not deal with the frictions created by the large (and growing) trade surplus of 
China. There is an abundant literature on this issue and the longer-term considerations that 
follow will be relevant regardless of what happens to the overall Chinese trade surplus (or the 
bilateral one with the EU).  
In assessing the likely future challenges of the rise of China for the EU, it might be useful to 
start from current perceived policy issues. 
2.  Yesterday’s policy issues: Cheap labour? 
A first policy issue concerns the composition of Chinese exports. Policy-makers seem still to be 
under the impression (correct until recently) that imports from China are likely to threaten 
mainly labour-intensive industries, such as clothing. Given the extremely high investment rates 
in China, however, this is likely to change rather quickly. Some illustrative calculations suggest 
that within the next decade China could reduce the present difference in capital/labour ratios 
considerably, implying that the composition of Chinese exports should shift quickly as well.  
The key fact that dominates the evolution of the capital/labour ratio in China is the very high 
Chinese investment rate. While there is some debate over the measurement of the denominator 
(GDP), it is generally agreed that China invests more than 40% of its GDP (against about 20% 
for the EU). This must be the starting point in any assessment of this issue. Recent results from 
the International Comparison Program of the World Bank has shown that China’s GDP at PPP 
has previously been overestimated, but even the new results suggest that it is around 40% that of CHINA AND INDIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU ECONOMY | 5 
 
the EU, if measured at PPP. (However, at current prices and exchange rates, the EU’s GDP is 
five times larger.) Given the much higher investment ratio, the net result is that, if measured at 
PPP, total investment in China is similar in size to that of the EU. According to the World 
Bank’s 2005 International Comparison Program (ICP) “Global Report”: 
The US accounts for the largest share of the world’s expenditure for investment, but at 
21 percent, it is closely followed by China with 18 percent. The 10 largest economies 
account for over more than two thirds of the world’s investment. The share of 
investment in low and middle income economies is larger when world shares of 
investment are measured in PPP terms.
1 
FDI plays only a minor part in determining the overall resources devoted to investment since 
total FDI inflows represent around 10% of all investment in China. The importance of FDI for 
China is thus not the amount of capital invested, but the transfer of technology that it brings 
about. 
Another reason why the capital stock is increasing much more quickly in China than in the EU 
is that the starting level of the capital stock in China is still much lower than in the EU. This 
implies that depreciation is much lower. In the EU, the (net) capital stock is increasing only 
slowly because most investment just makes up for depreciation, whereas the opposite is true in 
China.  
Tables 3 and 4 below contain some of the basic data that allow one to calculate the evolution of 
the capital/labour ratios in Europe and China. The GDP of China is about 40% that of the EU if 
measured at PPP, but with the investment ratios at 20% and 44%, respectively, this means that 
in absolute terms (annual) investment in China is actually of a similar size as that of the EU.  
One key question is the size of the labour force over which capital is spread in China. According 
to official statistics, total employment in China amounts to around 700 million, but only about 
one-half of this number is employed in the modern sector.
2 It is thus assumed here that the 
capital stock is used mainly in the modern sector, which employs about 350 million persons 
(against around 200 million for the EU).  
Data on the capital stock in China are scarce. A recent study
3 uses a variety of different methods 
and comes to the conclusion that the capital/output ratio is around 3.5. This would imply that 
today’s capital stock should be worth around $20 thousand billion against somewhat more than 
$60 thousand billion for the EU (always at PPP). 
Table 3. A comparison of Chinese and European capital stocks ($ billion at ppp) (2006 data) 
  GDP at PPP 
Investment 
as % of GDP 
Total 
investment 
Capital 
stock 
Labour force 
(millions) 
         Present  Future 
China 5,500  44  2,420 19,250  350  450 
EU 13,000  20  2,600  52,000  200  220 
Source: Own calculations based on WEO and World Bank data. 
                                                      
1  See  http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21589281~menuPK: 
34463 ~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html. 
2 This can be deduced both from the employment statistics by sectors (agriculture accounts for about 50% 
of employment) and the statistics by work place (about 50% are in rural regions).  
3  Kui-Wai Li (2003), “China’s Capital and Productivity Measurement Using Financial Resources”, 
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Given these starting values for the major variables, one can calculate the evolution of the capital 
stock by making an additional assumption about the rate of depreciation (assumed here to be 
0.04). The time horizon is 10 years over which it is also assumed that employment in the EU 
increases by about 10% (in line with the Lisbon objectives) and by 33% in China as the new 
generations coming into working age are assumed to be absorbed entirely by the modern sector. 
The ‘modern’ workforce of China would thus after ten years at 450 million persons be about 
twice as large as that of the EU.  
Given these assumptions, Table 4 reports the resulting capital/labour ratios. That of the EU 
remains constant as the small increase in the capital stock is just sufficient to keep the 
capital/labour ratio constant with the small increase in the workforce (the additional capital is 
just enough to equip the additional employment with the same amount of capital). However, the 
capital/labour ratio rises rapidly in China, from around 20% of that of the EU to over 70%. If 
China continues to keep its present high investment rate, it could thus have within a decade a 
capital/labour ratio similar to that of the EU (and the Chinese capital stock would be of a more 
recent vintage). At that point China should no longer specialise in labour-intensive goods. 
Table 4. The Chinese capital/labour ratio in motion (thousands of USD/worker) 
 Present  Future  (2016) 
China 55  191 
EU27 260  260 
India 38  48 
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank data. 
A key factor transforming the Chinese economy, and its likely trade pattern, is thus the 
extraordinary investment rate, which is more than twice that of the EU (or other OECD 
countries) and higher even than those of Japan and Korea during their respective high-growth 
periods. This implies that by the end of the next decade China could already have essentially 
caught up with Europe in terms of its capital/labour ratio. 
India by contrast has a much lower investment ratio. Using the same approach for that country 
yields the result reported in the last row of Table 4: India’s capital/labour ratio does not increase 
greatly because its investment rate is much lower and the employment in the modern sector will 
(hopefully) increase by much more. 
3.  Human capital: China a global player in R&D? 
While the current policy concerns focus on cheap labour, there have been a number of press 
reports suggesting that China is rapidly catching up in terms of innovation activity. The raw data 
suggest, however, that concerns that China will take over the lead in innovation activity on a 
broad scale might be exaggerated. Moreover, in this area the speed at which China can close the 
gap with the EU is limited by demographic factors. With a roughly constant population, the 
average stock of human capital per worker can change only gradually as better educated new 
generations replace the older ones. This is by definition a slow process. 
One can observe that the evolution in the stock of human capital in China seems to already have 
a strong basis, which is being reinforced quite rapidly, but it will take some time before the 
Chinese workforce will contain a similar percentage at the highest levels of education as that of 
the EU (or other OECD countries). However, given the size of its population, China is starting 
to count on the global scale – even at the tertiary level of education. This will now be illustrated 
from two different angles: the present situation and the future evolution as foreshadowed by 
enrolment ratios. CHINA AND INDIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU ECONOMY | 7 
 
Education in China today. One useful gauge of the overall stock of human capital in the 
workforce is the average years of education attained by members of the adult cohorts. Measured 
in this way, China has reached a respectable level, close to some member countries (such as 
France and Italy) and not far below the EU average, but it remains behind.  
The horizontal distance between two lines gives an idea of how much China is behind EU 
member countries. Between China and Italy the difference seems to be only about 10 years, but 
much more for France (and Germany). The data for 2010 provided for EU member countries are 
derived from Commission projections, which, in turn, are based on today’s enrolment ratios. 
These projections, which are not available for China, indicate that the upgrading of the 
workforce will continue in the EU as well so that the difference between China and the EU will 
not diminish if the upgrading in China just continues at this historical pace. The next section 
provides some data that suggest that the speed of the catch up will indeed not increase radically 
in future as well. 
Figure 1. Basic human capital: Average years of schooling in Europe and China 
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Source: Barro Lee dataset. 
Enrolment ratios. An indispensable input for R&D is a workforce with the appropriate level of 
education. Research and development is mostly undertaken by personnel with tertiary 
(university level) education.  
The available data indicate that the Chinese workforce will continue to lag behind that of the EU 
(and even more than that of the US) in terms of the percentage of the younger cohorts that have 
a tertiary education. In China the enrolment rate in tertiary education in 2005 was still only 20%, 
much lower than the 56% recorded for the EU (and even further from the US ratio of 83%). 
Over the last 20 years there has been a jump in tertiary education in China, with enrolment 
ratios increasing by a factor of 7. But the starting point was so low that even today enrolment 
rates are below one-half of the European level. It is interesting to note that despite its reputation, 
India has made much less progress than China (tertiary enrolment up only from 6 to 11%). The 
Indian software industry seems to constitute an exception that hides an average which has 
falling behind that of China. 8 | DANIEL GROS 
 
The upgrading of the skills of the Chinese workforce is thus proceeding less quickly than is 
sometimes assumed. However, one needs to recall that the cohorts that are currently studying 
(and will soon enter the labour force) are also much larger in China (about 3 times larger) than 
in the EU. This implies that in absolute terms one should expect that China will produce the 
same number of university graduates (including engineers, which have been the focus of much 
attention) as the EU. Moreover, as enrolment rates are still increasing rapidly it is unavoidable 
that China will soon overtake the EU (and the US) in terms of the number of scientists that 
graduate each year.  
Table 5. Enrolment ratios, 1985-2005 
 
Secondary education 
(Net) 
Tertiary education 
(Gross) 
  1985 1995 2005 1985  1995  2005 
China 39.7  65.8  74.3  2.9  5.3  20.3 
United States  91.2  90  89  60.2  80.9  82.7 
India 37.9  48.8  56.6  6  6.6  11.4 
EU27 (average)  82.7  97.9  100.8  26.7  44.9  56.2 
Turkey 36  51.3  66.8  8.9  19.5  31.2 
Source: World Bank. 
4.  Energy: China’s carbon-rich economy 
An additional area of friction that is likely to remain concerns energy. As shown in Table 6, 
China already now consumes almost as much energy as the EU (1,700 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (mtoe)/year versus 1,780), implying that its energy intensity (energy consumption 
per unit of output) is only slightly higher than that of the EU, at least if GDP is measured at PPP. 
However, the composition of China’s energy consumption is quite different from that of the EU 
(or the US): China consumes almost four times as much coal as the EU. Moreover, if current 
trends continue, China would in 10 years consume 50% more energy than the EU. Most of the 
increase in the energy demand is likely to continue to come from coal, which is relatively 
abundant in China.  
Table 6. Energy consumption and composition (mtoe) 
Primary energy consumption  Major fuels (2006) 
  1996  Today (2006)   Projected (2016) 
Oil 
(net imports) 
Coal 
(consumption) 
EU 1691  1782  1878  720  (560)  320 
US 2190  2326  2471  940  (608)  567 
China 965  1698  2987  350  (169)  1,191 
India 271  423  680  120  (80)  240 
Sources: BP (2007), World Energy Review. 
 
China’s self-sufficiency in coal has two implications: 
i) China is already now the biggest source of CO2 emissions (coal is much more intensive in 
CO2 than the equivalent energy obtained through oil or gas). Hence considerable frictions will 
arise to the extent that limiting CO2 emissions remains an objective of EU policy. China will not 
be willing to accept any CO2 tax, but if it were introduced by the EU, or at least throughout the 
OECD, this would create an important competitive advantage for Chinese producers. CHINA AND INDIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU ECONOMY | 9 
 
ii) China is much less dependent on hydrocarbon imports than either the EU or the US, and the 
price of coal has increased much less than that for either oil or gas. The price of coal at various 
international trading stations has roughly doubled between 1999 and 2007, whereas the price 
has increased by a factor of 4 for crude oil (and gas). This fall in the relative price of coal will 
give Chinese producers a further cost advantage in energy-intensive industries (e.g. again 
steel).India resembles China in that it also has abundant coal reserves, but in terms of overall 
size, they are again much smaller, about one-quarter those of China, with a total annual 
consumption of primary energy of about 400 mtoe. 
5.  The EU and the rise of China  
For a European it is interesting to observe that the process going on in China today is in many 
respects almost exactly the mirror image of the convergence process experienced within the 
enlarged EU. The new member countries had a relatively well-educated population, with only a 
small proportion still in agriculture, but they lacked a modern capital stock and the associated 
market-relevant know-how. The new member countries thus became large importers of capital, 
mostly in the form of FDI. As a result, productivity is increasing rapidly, allowing wages to 
converge quickly to the EU average.  
By contrast in China, only part of the population works in the modern sector and the supply of 
domestic savings is much larger. With a domestic investment rate of close to 50%, the 
contribution of capital deepening to growth is (at roughly 5 percentage points per annum) the 
dominant growth factor in China.
4 The role of FDI in China is thus ‘only’ to facilitate the 
transfer of know-how, not to provide funds for investment. Capital deepening is proceeding at 
such a rapid pace that on current trends China will have a capital/labour ratio close to that of the 
EU within the next decade, and even before the new member states. 
These differences between the economies of the new member states and China imply that in 
future the brunt of the adjustment to the rise of China will have to be borne by the capital- (and 
energy-) intensive industries in the old member states. The workers in these industries are not 
necessarily low skilled; they tend to have the highly specialised skills necessary to operate the 
large capital employed in these industries. They are generally well paid and organised, thus 
constituting, together with the capital owners, a strong lobby for protectionism. 
A further key difference between China and the new member countries concerns the role of 
financial markets: they were totally liberalised in the latter and the domestic banking systems 
were taken over by EU banks. This has permitted the financing of a consumption boom and thus 
large capital imports. By contrast in China, financial markets have not yet been liberalised, 
leading, in conjunction with the absence of a social security safety net, to extraordinarily high 
savings rates. China has thus become a large (net) capital exporter, with its net supply of savings 
to the rest of the world (its current account surplus) now close to 1% of world GDP.  
What does the emergence of a large exporter of capital goods and an increase in the supply of 
global savings imply for the EU? The increased supply of savings should keep interest rates low, 
but this does not require any particular policy reaction assuming it is properly recognised by the 
ECB. The very large current account surplus of China is a relatively recent phenomenon, and it 
is not going to increase indefinitely. Once it stabilises, China’s imports will increase in line with 
exports, and the country will thus not have a deflationary impact on the global economy forever. 
The ongoing shift from intra- to inter-industry trade that will result from the shift towards 
relatively capital-intensive products in China’s exports suggests that labour market flexibility 
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and constant re-training are more important than a special concern for unskilled workers in 
general. Another policy implication is that regional and industrial policies, which tend to 
support capital-intensive industries via investment subsidies are unlikely to work. As China 
becomes stronger and stronger in these sectors, these industries will not be able to survive 
without continuing support. 
Taxing imports of capital-intensive products from China is not a policy option since China is a 
full member of the WTO. But even if it were possible, it would have an undesirable effect on 
income distribution since it would be favourable to capital owners, but have a negative impact 
on labour. 
A key peculiarity of China’s economy is its extraordinary degree of openness: exports amount 
to about 40% of GDP, a figure closer to the average of individual EU member countries, rather 
than the roughly 15% one observes for the EU and US and would thus expect from a continent-
sized economy. Moreover, about 60% of these exports are generated by so-called ‘foreign 
invested enterprises’ (enterprises with a large foreign participation).
5  Over one-half of the 
Chinese ‘export machine’ is thus managed by foreigners. This suggests that while China is 
likely to remain stubborn in the pursuit of its perceived national interests, it is unlikely to 
become a disruptive element in the world economy. There is thus no reason why the EU should 
assume a confrontational stance vis-à-vis China. 
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Annex 
A Comparison of Chinese and Indian export structures 
A simple way to document the evolution of the structure of Chinese trade is to look at the 
Balassa index, which shows to what extent a country’s share in world exports of a certain 
category of goods is higher or lower than the share of the country in overall world exports. For 
example, if a country provides 15% of global exports of machinery, but its share in overall 
global exports is only 10%, the Balassa index will be equal to 1.5, indicating that the country 
has a revealed comparative advantage in this sector. 
Table A1 below shows to what extent there is a similarity between the distribution of the 
Balassa index across the major SITC categories for China and for a group of other comparator 
countries. The crude measure used here is just the correlation coefficient of the Balassa index 
across 1-digit SITC categories (times 100). Given the small number of observations, individual 
results are not statistically significant, but the overall picture is clear: all correlation coefficients 
have changed sign over the last 20 years.  
Twenty years ago the (distribution of sectoral export) specialisation of China seemed to be 
negatively correlated with that of major OECD countries and positively correlated with that of 
other emerging markets, such as Brazil and Indonesia.  
Today (2005 data) the structure of Chinese exports is positively correlated with all OECD 
countries (the correlation is strongest with those countries (J, DE) specialised in heavy industry), 
but negatively correlated with other emerging market economies. 
Table A1. An evolving Chinese export structure  
 1986  2005 
China* -3   
US -27  25 
Japan -49  62 
Germany -71  46 
Brazil 25  -45 
Indonesia 67  -38 
Italy -24  42 
* China 1986 versus 2005. 
Note: Data represent correlation coefficients (*100) between the Balassa index for China and the other 
countries listed in the first column. 
Source: Own calculations based on UN Comtrade data. 
It is interesting to note, as mentioned, that the correlation coefficient has turned negative for the 
pairs China-Brazil and China-Indonesia. One could thus argue that the challenge to the EU 
provided by China is the opposite of that coming from these two countries. Hence it is 
misleading to lump the so-called ‘BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India and China) together. 
The first row of Table A1 shows that today’s export structure of China has little to do with that 
of 20 years ago since the correlation coefficient is essentially zero. 
Table A2 shows that the correlation coefficient between China and India has diminished over 
time and is now rather low (17). This suggests that the structure of the challenge to the EU 
provided by India is quite different from that coming from China (even apart from the 
difference in size mentioned above). 12 | DANIEL GROS 
 
The first row of the table shows that India’s export structure has changed little over the last 20 
years, since the correlation coefficient is rather high (72%). This is another indication of the 
different dynamics of these two countries. 
Table A2. A stagnant Indian export structure? 
 1986  2005 
India* 72 
China 37  17 
US -13 32 
Japan -30  -14 
Germany -31  -24 
Brazil 64  45 
Indonesia -22  -9 
Italy 15  -24 
* India 1986 versus 2005. 
Note: Data represent correlation coefficients (*100) between the Balassa index for India and the other countries 
listed in the first column. 
Source: Own calculations based on UN Comtrade data. About CEPS
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•	 Formation	of	nine	different	research	networks,	
comprising	research	institutes	from	throughout	
Europe	and	beyond,	to	complement	and	
consolidate	CEPS	research	expertise	and	to	greatly	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	some	120	
Corporate	Members	and	130	Institutional	
Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	practical	
experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	for	the	
utility	and	feasability	of	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
CEPS	carries	out	its	research	via	its	own	in-house	
research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.